000			03513cam a2200373 a 4500
001			37946
003			0000000000
005			20240411192407.0
008			110531s2011 gw s 000 0 eng d
010			_a2011930808
020			_a3642195180
020			_a9783642195181
035			_a.b70620520
035			_a(OCoLC)724703704
040			_aBTCTA _beng _cBTCTA _dDLC _dYDXCP _dOHX _dBWX _dNUI _dUtOrBLW
042			_alccopycat
049			_aOSU&
050	0	0	_aHB99.5 _b.P66 2011
050	0	0	_aHB99.5 _b.P66 2011
100	1		_aSchofield, Norman.
245	0	0	_aPolitical economy of institutions, democracy and voting _h[electronic resource] / _cNorman Schofield, Gonzalo Caballero, editors.
260			_aHeidelberg : _bSpringer, _c2011.
300			_aix, 425 p.
500			_aIncludes bibliographic references.
504			_aIncludes bibliographical references
505	0		_aInstitutions: Rules or Equilibria? -- War, Wealth, and the Formation of States -- Why Do Weak States Prefer Prohibition to Taxation? -- Self-enforcing, Public-order Institutions for Contract Enforcement: Litigation Regulation, and Limited Government in Venice, 1050 -- 1350 -- Judicial Stability During Regime Change: Apex Courts in India 1937-1960 -- Institutional Arrangements Matter for Both Efficiency and Distribution: Contributions and Challenges of the New Institutional Economics -- Institutional Foundations, Committee System and Amateur Legislators in the Governance of the Spanish Congress: An Institutional Comparative Perspective (USA, Argentina, Spain). Coalition Governments and Electoral Behavior: Who Is Accountable? -- Democracy and Voting: Empirical and Formal Models of the United States Presidential Elections in 2000 and 2004 -- Modelling Elections in Post-Communist Regimes: Voter Perceptions, Political Leaders and Activists -- Electoral Systems and Party Responsiveness -- Electoral Institutions and Political Corruption: Ballot Structure, Electoral Formula, and Graft -- A Model of Party Entry in Parliamentary Systems with Proportional Representation -- Moving in Time: Legislative Party Switching as Time-Contingent Choice -- On the Distribution of Particularistic Goods -- Vote Revelation: Empirical Content of Scoring Rules.
520			_aThis book presents the latest research ¡in the field of Political Economy, dealing with the integration of economics and politics and the way institutions affect social decisions. The authors are eminent scholars from the U.S., Canada, Britain, Spain, Italy, Mexico and the Philippines. Many of them have been influenced by Nobel laureate Douglass North, who pioneered the new institutional social sciences, or by William H. Riker who contributed to the field of positive political theory. The book focuses on topics such as: case studies in institutional analysis; research on war and the formation of states; the analysis of corruption; new techniques for analyzing elections, involving game theory and empirical methods; comparing elections under plurality and proportional rule, and in developed and new democracies. ¡.
650		0	_aDemocracy _xEconomic aspects.
650		0	_aInstitutional economics _xSocial aspects.
700	1		_aCaballero. Gonzalo.
700	1		_aSchofield, Norman, _d1944-
856			_uhttps://drive.google.com/file/d/1iMYbxnjCW5bFPONW5sCpVTD-AcPdabFM/view?usp=sharing
999			_c5425 _d5425